Analysts Accuse Prof. Isaac Boadi of Selective Figures, Political Spin
By Daily Democrat News Desk
There has been a fiery clash over Ghana’s cocoa producer price as financial and economic journalists challenge what they see as a selective and politically motivated take on cocoa pricing by the Institute of Economic Research and Public Policy (IERPP) headed by its Executive Director, Professor Isaac Boadi.
The journalists say the commentary by the IERPP fails to take into account exchange-rate movements, forward sales, actual procurement volumes and the timing of the Government’s producer-price decisions, creating what they say is a misleading picture of the financial position of cocoa farmers and the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).
Award-winning financial and economic journalist Adnan Adams Mohammed, who led the charge of journalists, says he has monitored the cocoa industry for some time now but has particularly questioned the methodology used to compare cocoa prices in different periods.
According to the analysts, comparing nominal cedi prices from 2024, late 2025 and 2026 without accounting for changes in the exchange rate and international cocoa prices can give confusing conclusions that are not reflective of the economics of the industry.
THE PRICE TIMELINE THAT CHANGES THE STORY
At the heart of the controversy is the timing of COCOBOD’s reported profit in 2025 and the subsequent reduction in the producer price in February 2026.
The journalists point out that the SIGA report showing COCOBOD’s profit for 2025 relates to the position as at December 2025.
At the time, the analysts contend, the producer price was GH¢3,625 per bag.
They, therefore, reject any suggestion that the December 2025 financial position should be interpreted using the lower producer price announced in February 2026.
“The price was reduced in February 2026 and not December 2025,” the analysts argue, insisting that the distinction is critical in reading COCOBOD’s financial accounts.
They maintain that using a subsequent price reduction to explain a financial position that existed before the reduction is mixing periods and potentially drawing the wrong conclusion.
70% OF COCOA PURCHASED AT HIGHER PRICE
The journalists have challenged the portrayal of GH¢2,500 per bag as though it represented the dominant price paid to cocoa farmers throughout the season.
According to their analysis, more than 70 per cent of the season’s cocoa purchases were made at higher producer-price levels.
They cite an initial price of about GH¢3,228.75 per bag, equivalent to GH¢51,660 per tonne, based on 70 per cent of gross FOB revenue at US$5,040 per tonne.
The producer price was then increased to approximately GH¢3,625 per bag, or GH¢58,000 per tonne.
The GH¢2,500 rate, the analysts argue, accounted for less than 30 per cent of purchases.
The analysts, therefore, contend that presenting the lower rate as though it represented the entire season can give the public an inaccurate perception of what the majority of farmers actually received.
WORLD MARKET PRICES – THE MISSING PIECE
The journalists say another critical issue missing from the IERPP argument is the nature of the international cocoa market.
Cocoa is traded in the international market using the US dollar but Ghanaian farmers receive their producer price in cedis.
Consequently, the journalists argue that farmgate pricing cannot be measured simply by placing different cedi figures side by side without considering exchange-rate movements, international prices, inflation and Ghana’s cocoa marketing system.
They also point to COCOBOD’s use of forward sales and hedging arrangements, which are designed to provide more price security and protect the cocoa sector against sharp market reversals.
To the journalists, comparing a guaranteed producer price with a temporary peak in international spot-market prices is not necessarily an economically sound comparison.
THE FEBRUARY 2026 PRICE CUT
The biggest test of the competing narratives came after the international cocoa market fell sharply.
The journalists point to approximately 51,000 tonnes of unsold cocoa that had to be sold at about US$4,200 per tonne rather than the previously anticipated US$7,200, resulting, according to the figures cited by the journalists, in a loss of roughly US$150 million, equivalent to about GH¢1.64 billion.
When the producer price was reduced in February 2026, the world market was hovering around US$4,200 per tonne.
The analysts say farmers were consequently receiving about 90 per cent of the international market value, equivalent to approximately US$3,780 per tonne.
At an exchange rate of around GH¢10.95 to the US dollar, that translated to approximately GH¢41,392 per tonne, or about GH¢2,587 per bag.
But the market did not remain at US$4,200.
The price then fell to as low as approximately US$3,420 per tonne.
At this point, the analysts argue, the farmer’s effective producer price was actually above the prevailing international market value, creating additional financial pressure on COCOBOD.
WHERE WOULD THE MONEY COME FROM?
This has prompted a fundamental question from the financial journalists: If COCOBOD had generated a cash surplus earlier in the cycle, could that money simply have remained untouched when the international market collapsed?
They argue that COCOBOD must finance far more than the farmgate price.
In addition to logistics, cocoa evacuation, quality control, shipping and financing obligations are costs that must be met.
The Board also supports farmers through programmes involving fertiliser, insecticides, fungicides, spraying equipment and other interventions.
The analysts therefore caution against treating COCOBOD’s reported accounting profit at one point in time as if it automatically represented cash available to meet every subsequent financial obligation.
COCOA POLITICS IS KILLING THE INDUSTRY
For Mr. Adnan Adams Mohammed, the leader of the group, the debate should go beyond partisan politics.
He argues that organisations and associations connected to cocoa must provide platforms where farmers can engage COCOBOD constructively instead of turning every disagreement into a political confrontation.
“I have been in the cocoa industry for so many years now. This kind of politics is killing it,” the journalist is reported to have said.
He urged stakeholders to remain objective and for farmer organisations to be meaningful platforms for dialogue, scrutiny and engagement with COCOBOD.
The general argument by the financial journalists is that criticism of government policy is legitimate, but economic analysis must be rigorous, properly timed and transparent about its assumptions.
They contend that cherry-picking one producer price, one international market quotation or one financial figure without examining the entire cocoa marketing cycle can create headlines that may be politically attractive but are economically misleading.
QUESTIONS OVER ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
The controversy has also raised questions about the responsibility of academics and think tanks when commenting on politically sensitive economic policies.
Critics of Prof. Boadi’s position say his public interventions should be judged on the quality, completeness and consistency of the evidence presented rather than on political affiliation.
However, the allegation that his analysis is politically motivated is a matter of contention and Prof. Boadi or IERPP should be given an opportunity to respond to the specific criticisms.
For the financial journalists, the central issue is not whether COCOBOD or the Mahama administration should be criticised.
They insist that Ghana’s cocoa crisis requires facts, context and professional analysis not selective numbers or partisan interpretations.
With cocoa farmers facing uncertainty from volatile global prices, the analysts say the country can ill afford a public debate where competing political narratives overshadow the complex financial realities facing the industry.
Their message is simple: hold COCOBOD accountable, challenge government decisions where necessary, but let the figures speak for themselves.
