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KGL Makes Millions for Sustainability of NLA, and uses its Profits to Support National Development

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BEYOND EARLY DETECTION: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BREAST CANCER DIAGNOSIS? 

  Breast cancer awareness must go beyond pink ribbons, screening campaigns and calls for early detection. Ghana must also confront whether its health system is adequately prepared to care for those who receive a diagnosis. Every October, pink ribbons, awareness campaigns and screening activities remind us of the importance of early detection in the fight against breast cancer. Across workplaces, churches, communities and health facilities, women are encouraged to examine their breasts, attend screening programmes and seek medical attention when they notice unusual changes. These messages are important. Early detection can improve treatment outcomes and save lives. But after losing someone I cared deeply about to breast cancer, I have found myself reflecting on a question that deserves equal attention: What happens after early detection? Let me call her Abena. Abena was a woman in her late thirties, a working professional who had spent more than a decade advocating for breast cancer awareness. She organised screening activities within her church and workplace and encouraged other women to take their breast health seriously. She understood the importance of early detection and actively promoted it. In August 2023, she discovered a lump in her armpit. An initial ultrasound examination reportedly indicated that the finding was benign. However, the swelling persisted, and a month later she noticed changes in her left breast. Further investigations, including biopsy, eventually confirmed breast cancer in November 2023. What followed was a difficult journey through the healthcare system. The physician who requested the investigations had travelled outside the country by the time the results became available. Abena was asked to wait until the physician returned before a referral could be made to the next level of care. Eventually, a colleague facilitated the referral. At the oncology unit, she was informed that the workload was high and that an arrangement described to her as "intramural" payment could secure an earlier appointment. Without this payment, her first appointment would have been in February 2024. She paid and was seen that same day. Subsequent review visits also involved additional payments.   The financial demands did not end with securing appointments. Each chemotherapy session cost approximately GH¢2,000, while a supportive injection administered after each session cost about GH¢900 at the time. The medication was provided for administration by health workers at a nearby facility. Abena completed eight cycles of chemotherapy and was preparing for a total mastectomy. Throughout this period, her health deteriorated. She experienced significant complications, including loss of sight and speech, and eventually died in June 2024. Yet, even while battling the illness, she managed to complete her Master of Laws programme. Her determination to keep going remains one of the things I remember most about her. I share Abena's story not to suggest that every aspect of her care was inappropriate or that one experience represents the entire health system. Neither can I establish that the challenges she encountered alone determined the outcome of her illness. However, her experience raises difficult questions about access, affordability, referral coordination and the support available to patients navigating serious illnesses in Ghana. A diagnosis should mark the beginning of a coordinated response, not the beginning of another struggle to find care. BEYOND AWARENESS: EXAMINING THE HEALTH SYSTEM  Early detection is only one part of the cancer care pathway. Following a suspicious finding, patients need timely diagnostic investigations, clear communication of results, appropriate referral, specialist consultation, treatment and continuous follow-up. These services must work together. Delays at any point can create additional anxiety, financial pressure and uncertainty for patients. This is particularly important when viewed against Ghana's commitment to achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2030. The Sustainable Development Goals, especially SDG 3, call on countries to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages. Target 3.8 specifically commits countries to universal health coverage, including access to quality essential healthcare services, affordable medicines and financial risk protection. These commitments must translate into meaningful experiences for people who seek care. Universal health coverage cannot be measured simply by the number of people who enter a health facility or the availability of screening services. It must also be reflected in whether patients receive the right diagnosis at the right time, whether referrals lead to actual access to care, whether treatment is affordable and whether continuity of care is assured. The question is not only whether we can detect diseases early, but whether our health system is prepared to respond effectively when we do. Patient navigation is one area that deserves greater attention in strengthening cancer care. Nurse navigators play an important role in helping patients move through what can be a complex and overwhelming healthcare pathway. They support coordination of appointments and referrals, facilitate communication between patients and healthcare providers, help identify financial and psychosocial barriers and promote continuity throughout treatment. Ghana has made efforts to introduce and strengthen patient navigation services. However, we must look beyond the existence of individual initiatives and ask questions about their reach and sustainability. How many breast cancer nurse navigators are available across the country? How many have undergone structured, competency-based training in patient navigation? Are these services accessible to patients outside the major tertiary hospitals? Do we have adequate systems for their deployment, supervision and continued professional development? A patient navigator should not merely direct a patient from one department to another. The role requires the knowledge and skills to coordinate care, anticipate barriers and help ensure that patients are not lost along the treatment pathway. Strengthening this service should therefore form part of our broader investment in cancer care. The challenges highlighted by Abena's experience are also not exclusive to cancer. Patients living with hypertension, diabetes, stroke, kidney disease and other chronic conditions face similar needs for timely diagnosis, appropriate referral, affordable medicines, regular monitoring and continuity of care. As the burden of non-communicable diseases continues to increase, the demands on our health system will become even greater. This is therefore a broader health-system concern. We need to examine how effectively our services are organised to support patients from the point of first contact through diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation and follow-up. The ability to provide continuous, coordinated and person-centered care must become a central measure of the quality of our healthcare delivery. TURNING POLICY COMMITMENTS INTO PATIENT EXPERIENCES  Ghana's Free Primary Healthcare initiative presents an opportunity to strengthen access to essential services, improve early identification of health conditions and reduce barriers at the primary healthcare level. Similarly, the Ghana Medical Trust Fund offers an opportunity to address some of the financial challenges associated with serious and chronic illnesses. These are important interventions, but their impact will depend on how effectively they connect with the wider health system. Expanding access to primary healthcare must be accompanied by adequate diagnostic capacity, functional referral systems, specialist services, essential medicines and a health workforce equipped to provide quality care. Financial support must also translate into access to the actual services patients need and when they need them. We must be careful not to create a situation where patients are encouraged to seek early care but encounter delays, prohibitive costs or limited treatment options once a serious diagnosis is confirmed. Access to healthcare should not end at the point of screening or diagnosis. It must extend throughout the patient's journey. This also calls for deliberate investment in the health workforce. Nurses and midwives are central to patient education, early identification, care coordination, treatment support and follow-up. Their capacity must be strengthened through appropriate training, adequate staffing, supportive working environments and the resources required to deliver quality care. Patient navigation, for instance, should not depend solely on isolated projects or the commitment of a few individuals. It should be deliberately integrated into the organisation of cancer services. BEYOND OCTOBER: A CALL FOR NATIONAL REFLECTION  Breast cancer awareness should not end when October ends. Screening campaigns and public education remain essential, but they must be matched by a health system that can respond to the needs of those who receive a diagnosis. Abena's story is a reminder that behind every diagnosis is a mother, a family and a future that may depend on how effectively the health system responds. It is also a reminder that the success of our health policies should ultimately be judged by the experiences and outcomes of the people they are intended to serve. As a country working towards UHC by 2030, we must move beyond counting the number of people screened, educated or reached through awareness campaigns. We must also ask whether those who need further investigations can access them promptly, whether referrals are completed, whether treatment is affordable and whether patients receive the support required to complete their care. This reflection is in honour of Abena and the souls our health system might have failed. Their stories should challenge us to look beyond awareness and confront the gaps that patients encounter when they need care the most. Early detection is important. But what happens afterwards is equally important. And so, beyond the pink ribbons, the screening campaigns and the annual calls for early detection, I leave us with one question: WHAT'S NEXT AFTER EARLY DETECTION?  I hope this question will spark a much-needed national conversation among policymakers, healthcare professionals, health institutions, civil society, communities and every Ghanaian who depends on the health system. We must collectively examine whether our healthcare delivery system is adequately prepared not only to detect illnesses, but also to provide timely, affordable, quality and continuous care to those who need it. Maame Akosua Serwaa Gyening Email: masagg30@gmail.com  

 

Integrity and credibility are built on consistency but unfortunately it seems our colleagues at Fourth Estate and Media Foundation for West Africa are gradually undermining their own integrity and credibility in relation to their investigative work about NLA-KGL deal, and I say so due to these facts:
On 19th September 2025, Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah claimed that, NLA has exchanged a prime business for a peanut of GHS 170 million from KGL for the year 2025.

On 9th October 2025, Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah indicated that, NLA received GHS 157.6 million from KGL for 2024, and surprisingly today, 16th October 2025, Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah are misinforming their gullible readers that, “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero”.

The question many intelligent Ghanaians are asking Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah is that, if per their own narrative published on 19th September 2025 and 9th October 2025, if NLA received GHS 157.6 million in 2024 from KGL, and to receive GHS 170 million from KGL in 2025 then on what basis is Fourth Estate telling Ghanaians that, KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero? So, according to the mathematical brains of Fourth Estate, GHS 157.6 million(2024) + GHS 170 million(2025) equals to ZERO PROFIT for NLA?

In total, NLA would obtained GHS 327.6 million(GHS 157.6m + GHS 170 m) from KGL for the financial years of 2024 and 2025.

This amount of GHS 327.6 million paid by KGL to NLA shall definitely goes up if monies NLA received from KGL in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 are added.

Also, on Monday, 13th October 2025, Fourth Estate published that, “in 2019, for the first year of the NLA-KGL deal, NLA’s PROFIT for the State reduced to GHS 17 million”. So, if NLA could make a profit of GHS 17 million for the State in the first year of NLA-KGL deal in 2019 then why is Fourth Estate turning 360 degrees to say that, “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero”?

*KGL Profit in 2024*

For the avoidance of any doubt, KGL make a profit of GHS 70 million while it pays GHS 157.6 million to the NLA. This data clearly shows that NLA rather makes more money than what KGL earned as a profit in 2024.

A fact check from Ghana Revenue Authority(GRA) also indicate that, KGL paid taxes to GRA in 2024, an amount higher than the profit earned by KGL in 2024.

By the end of 2025, both the National Lottery Authority(NLA) and Ghana Revenue Authority(GRA) shall receive payments from KGL which would be eventually higher than the profit of KGL for 2025.

In the beginning of their “JANDAM” investigative journalism, Fourth Estate Lied that KGL was controlling a GHS 3 billion prime business but today, 16th October 2025, the same Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah are telling us that, “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero”. What kind of inconsistency is that. How can a “billionaire KGL” according to Sulemana Briamah and Fourth Estate on 19th September 2025 is now rather “making millions as profit” instead of making billions as profit? This should let the gullible readers of Sulemana Briamah and Fourth Estate understand that, they are being “fooled” by Jandam Journalism.

*DEBTS of NLA in the Absence of NLA-KGL deal*

From the audited accounts of NLA below were the DEBTS of NLA from 2012-2019:

2012 – – – GHS 16, 754,642.18

2013 – – – GHS 56, 917, 633.63

2014 – – – GHS 11, 597, 177.79

2015 – – – GHS 18, 306, 364.73

2016 – – – GHS 21, 035, 212.20

2017 – – – GHS 14, 601, 385.04

2018 – – – GHS 560, 155.27

2019 – – – GHS 26, 624, 188.53

Based on the aforementioned debts of NLA from 2012-2019, would it be appropriate and justified to put the blame on NLA-KGL deal? Certainly not.

The provisional license of NLA-KGL deal was signed in November 2019, so definitely the deal has no role in the past debts incurred by the NLA.

NLA started making its losses long before KGL was issued exclusive provisional license agreement by NLA in November 2019.

The total debts of NLA BEFORE NLA-KGL deal was around GHS 233, 121, 889.28 million, as accumulated debts, which comprises:
1. Unpaid Lotto Prizes to winners of national lotto.
2. Unpaid Contractors
3. Unpaid Withholding Tax(Income Tax) to Ghana Revenue Authority(GRA).
4. Unpaid SSNIT Contributions.
5. Unpaid Technical Service Providers(TSP) Fees.
6. Unpaid Lotto Commission to Lotto Marketing Companies.
7. Unpaid Provident Fund
8. Unpaid Staff Union and Association Dues Deductions.

Some of the problems of NLA are the:
1. existing revenue sharing agreement with Technical Service Providers(each receiving 6% on the gross revenue generated by the Authority via Point of Sale Terminals).
2. 25% commission to Lotto Marketing Companies retailing lotto products via Kiosks and Point of Sale Terminals(previously it was 20%).
3. Illegal lottery operations.
4. Higher Win – Ratios
5. No capping on the amount of money used for staking Lotto by the public.

*NLA Transfers to Consolidated Fund Has Nothing to do with NLA-KGL Deal*

The duty of NLA to transfer money to the Consolidated Fund is a political and management decision which has absolutely nothing to do with NLA-KGL deal.

The responsibility of KGL is to pay its fees to the NLA in accordance with the terms and conditions of its license agreement.

What NLA does with the money paid by KGL is NOT the business of KGL, just like KGL cannot dictate to Ghana Revenue Authority(GRA) on how it uses the taxes paid by KGL to the State.

Would you also blame KGL if GRA is unable to transfer the paid taxes of KGL to the Consolidated Fund?

For the purposes of education, it is extremely difficult to even fault the Board and management of NLA if they fail to transfer monies to the Consolidated Fund on monthly basis as stated in Section 32(4) of National Lotto Act, 2006(Act 722) because Section 32(4) of Act 722 can ONLY be fully implemented if Section 32(3) of Act 722 has been fully implemented.

According to Section 32(3) of Act 722, “The Authority shall pay out of the Lotto Account prize monies for winners of National Lotto and commissions to Lotto Marketing Companies licensed by the Authority”. This provision must be satisfied before you can proceed with the implementation of Section 32(4) of Act 722 which states that, “The Authority shall transfer the *net balance in the Lotto Account* on monthly basis to the Consolidated Fund”.

So, what if there is NO net balance in the Lotto Account after the payments of:
1. Prize monies for winners of National Lotto as stated in Section 32(3) of Act 722?
2. Commissions to Lotto Marketing Companies licensed by the Authority as stated in Section 32(3) of Act 722?
3. Operational and capital expenditure from the Lotto Fund as stated in Section 50 of Act 722?

For political expediency, the NLA mostly rob winners of national Lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers, operational and administrative expenditures in order to transfer money into the Consolidated Fund. For instance, the NLA in:

(a). 2012, transferred GHS 20, 000,000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 16, 754, 642.18.

(b). 2013, transferred GHS 25, 000, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers, etc. at cost of GHS 56, 917, 633.63

(c). 2014, transferred GHS 11, 850, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 11, 597, 177.79.

(d). 2015, transferred GHS 33, 270, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 18, 306, 364.73

(e). 2016, transferred GHS 16, 000, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 21, 035, 212.20.

(f). 2017, transferred GHS 30, 000, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 14, 601, 385. 04

(g). 2018, transferred GHS 33, 927, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 560, 155.27

(h). 2019, transferred GHS 16, 962, 000.00 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers etc. at a cost of GHS 26, 624, 188.53

(i) 2020, transferred GHS 22, 400, 495.24 to the Consolidated Fund yet the Authority was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers, Contractors, Suppliers etc. at a cost of GHS 66, 725, 129.91

From the evidence above based on Facts and Data, it is very clear that, in order for NLA to transfer monies to the Consolidated Fund in accordance with Section 32(4) of Act 722, there is the need for the NLA to breach Section 32(3) of Act 722. This has always been the case from enactment of National Lotto Act, 2006(Act 722).

From 2012-2020(9years), NLA transferred a total amount of GHS 209, 409, 495.24 to the Consolidated Fund yet within that same period of 2012-2020, NLA was indebted to winners of national lotto, Lotto Marketing Companies, Technical Service Providers, Suppliers etc. at a cost of GHS 233, 121, 889.28

So what is the justification for Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah to needlessly blame KGL Technology Limited as the cause of NLA inability to transfer money to the Consolidated Fund in accordance with Section 32(4) of Act 722? Completely no basis at all.

And why should NLA necessarily transfer monies to the Consolidated Fund if they haven’t been able to pay winners of national lotto, commissions to Lotto Marketing Companies, Fees to Technical Service Providers, Salaries and benefits of NLA Workers etc.?

*KGL Contributions to National Development of Ghana*

About 50-70% of KGL’s Profits are invested into Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) and Corporate Social Investments(CSI) across the country to champion national development, and some of the CSR and CSI activities of KGL are as follows:
1. Construction of multimillion-dollar ultra-modern Mental Health Facility in Kumasi in collaboration with Otumfuo Osei Tutu II.
2. Face-lift for Accra Psychiatric Hospital.
3. Support to Akropong School for the Blind.
4. Donations to Flood Victims at Keta
5. Democracy Cup initiative by the Parliament of Ghana.
6. Sponsorship to Ghana Football Association
7. Sponsorship to Ghana Black Stars and other National Football Teams.
8. Millennium Marathon
9. Scholarships to Orphans, Needy, and Destitute Children.
10. Two Million Ghana Cedis annually to support NLA Good Causes Foundation.
11. Three Million Ghana Cedis annually to support NLA-KGL Stabilization Fund.
12. Refurbishment of NLA’s Draw Studio, Brennan Hall.
13. Payments of Live Lotto Draws of NLA
14. Several others not mentioned.

….. Signed….
Razak Kojo Opoku(PhD)
Former PR Manager of NLA.

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